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Anna Boucher 
The political participation of Berlin’s Turkish migrants in the dual citizenship and 
headscarf debates: A multi-level comparison. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
When Turkish migrants came to Germany in the early 1960s as guest workers, it was not 
expected that they would stay. The notion of “return” was intrinsic to the guest worker 
system, premised as it was on the importation of cheap labour without social or political 
costs.1 Workers would assist in the rebuilding of post-war Germany and then return to 
Turkey when the job was done. Yet even after the first oil crisis, a rise in unemployment 
and the official end to the guest worker program in 1973, most Turkish guest workers did 
not leave but rather made Germany their home. They became permanent residents. Five 
decades on, there are almost two million Turkish migrants without German citizenship in 
Germany.2 They comprise Germany’s biggest migrant group and a significant proportion of 
Germany’s three million Muslims.3 Further, unlike many other migrants in Germany, 
Turkish migrants do not hold European Union citizenship and therefore cannot benefit from 
the advantages this brings. The original Turkish guest workers, their children and their 
children’s children have largely remained foreigners. They are denied formal political 
rights such as the right to vote,4 the right to stand for office5 and the constitutionally 
protected rights to assemble and associate, although the latter are provided through statute.6  
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2. Chapter outline    
Given that the bulk of Turkish migrants in Germany remain non-citizens, the focus in this 
Chapter is upon Turkish migrants without German citizenship status. This chapter 
investigates the political participation of Berlin’s Turkish migrants given their absence of 
the formal political rights. In particular, the chapter focuses on how the opportunities for 
political participation differ at the federal, compared with the state or Land-level of German 
politics. This research question is investigated through the lens of Political Opportunity 
Structure (POS) theory – a theoretical tool that assists in analysing the institutional, cultural 
and historical factors that influence the political participation of social actors, including that 
of migrants. In particular, this chapter draws upon the work of European POS scholars who 
have argued that political participation is shaped by three ‘dimensions of opportunity’ – 
formal political institutions, informal procedures and prevailing state strategies and actor 
alliances and configurations.7 This theory and its application to the study of migrant 
activism is considered in Part 4 below, while Part 5 briefly canvasses methodological 
aspects of the POS approach.  
 
Parts 6 and 7 explore the POS facing Berlin’s Turkish migrants, at both the federal 
and state (Land) level of German politics, through an analysis of the political participation 
of Turkish migrants in Berlin in two contemporary political events. The federal case-study 
concerns participation of Berlin’s Turkish migrants in debates over the 
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (Nationality Act) (2000). This Act sought but largely failed to 
introduce dual citizenship in Germany. The political participation of Berlin’s Turkish 
migrants at the Land or “City-State” level is explored through the case-study of a ban on 
religious symbols in public positions by the City-State of Berlin in late 2004. These case-
studies were chosen both for their political relevance but also for their wider application to 
contestations over the social and legal inclusion of migrant groups in Germany. The 
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analysis focussed on Berlin due to the city’s position both as Germany’s capital and a City-
State of Germany in its own right. In applying POS to these two Berlin case-studies, this 
Chapter considers how different opportunities structures shape the possibility for political 
action in differentiated ways at the different levels of government. These issues are 
explored below. First, however, it is necessary to consider the historical context of Turkish 
migrant activism in Germany and POS theory, as well as the relevance of this theoretical 
approach to the study of Turkish migrants in Berlin.  
 
3. The historical context of Turkish political activism in Germany 
There is a dynamic historical relationship between the German state’s policies towards 
migrants (Ausländerpolitik) and Turkish political activism; each historical period of 
migration policy within Germany corresponds with changes in the nature of political 
activism among Turkish groups. The initial immigration of Turkish guestworkers to 
Germany must be viewed within the post-war economic growth enjoyed by Western 
European nations. This economic boom led to growing demand for labour, unmet by the 
domestic workforce.8 The first labour agreement was signed between Turkey and the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1961, and from this point onwards, the migration of Turks 
to Germany rose rapidly.9 During this period, Meier-Braun notes, Turkish migrants were 
viewed largely as a commodity, rather than as political agents in their own right.10 This 
perception reflected the prevailing position within the Ausländerpolitik that migrants would 
provide Germany with necessary manpower, and then repatriate. Following this general 
assumption, Turkish activism over this time, centred on labour and cultural, rather than 
distinctly political issues.11 As is discussed further in this Chapter, there was also a 
clientalistic aspect to Turkish engagement over this period. German organisations, such as 
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trade unions and Church groups, frequently represented Turks, rather than facilitating 
autonomous representation by Turkish migrants themselves.12  
 
Following rising domestic unemployment in the early 1970s, Germany introduced a general 
stop on labour migration in 1973. Known as the Anwerbestopp, the policy was intended to 
stem the continued immigration of guestworkers. It can thereby be seen as an exclusionary 
state policy. However, as several commentators have noted, subsequent federal government 
policy was often contradictory. While discouraging further immigration and actively 
encouraging repatriation to source countries, policies also focussed on the integration of 
existing migrants into German society.13 Largely as a result of an ongoing right to family 
reunification immigration, the Turkish population in Germany increased following the 
Anwerbestopp.14  From the early 1970s onwards, as the long-term settlement of Turkish 
migrants in Germany became an accepted reality, that political Turkish organisations also 
emerged. These organisations crossed the political spectrum and often reflected domestic 
Turkish political parties.15  By the 1980s, it was clear to policymakers that Turkish 
migrants had become a permanent feature of Germany. Turkish organisations responded 
through the consolidation of their autonomous political groups. Umbrella organisations 
were created for the various political associations established in the 1970s and there was 
also a proliferation into a wider range of issues, such as women’s concerns, integration and 
anti-discrimination.16   
 
The existing scholarship on the political activism of Turkish migrants in Germany is largely 
descriptive. Despite its acknowledgment of the relationship between Ausländerpolitik and 
Turkish migrant political activism, the literature lacks detailed analysis of the particular 
ways in which the German state shaped the activism that did emerge and how these 
historical trajectories inform current political engagement of Turkish migrants. Finally, the 
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historical literature often fails to differentiate between the national and state levels of 
German politics,17 despite the important differences between two levels for issues of 
migrant policy and integration, a point explored further in this Chapter. These shortcomings 
invite consideration of the theoretical contribution of Political Opportunity Structure theory 
to a study of Turkish activism in Berlin. 
 
4. Political opportunity structure theory and migrant activism  
Political Opportunity Structure theory provides a powerful tool to study the political 
participation and activism of migrant groups, including those without citizenship. In 
contrast to traditional political participation theory, POS is neither implicitly nor explicitly 
premised upon a link between political participation and citizenship status. The focus 
within traditional mainstream political participation theory on electoral politics meant that 
the political activities of disenfranchised migrants were implicitly ignored.18 Despite the 
emergence of the new social movements and the more recent expansion of the concept of 
political participation beyond elections, permanent migrants without citizenship continued 
to remain largely overlooked in the mainstream scholarship.19 In contrast, Political 
Opportunity Structure theory has emerged as a theoretical approach to study the position of 
activists who stand “outside of the polity”, or at least on its edges.20 POS theory draws 
upon neo-institutionalism, which advocates a shift away from behavioural explanations of 
political events, and raises a renewed interest in the role of institutions in shaping political 
outcomes.21 However, unlike most variants of neo-institutionalism,22 POS theory 
acknowledges the importance of political cultures and societal discourses in shaping 
political opportunities.23 The term “political opportunity structure” was first coined by 
Eisinger24 and was further developed by European scholars.   Tarrow describes political 
opportunity structures as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – 
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dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake 
collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.”25According to 
Tarrow these “dimensions” include the institutional strength of states, government 
structures, the state’s relation to new actors, and the existence of influential allies.26 Kriesi 
and his collaborators have developed this list into the following three dimensions of 
opportunity that shape political participation: i) formal institutions; ii) informal procedures 
and prevailing state strategies; and iii) actor alliances and configurations.27  
 
In this Chapter, these three categories are adopted as the starting point for an 
analysis of political opportunities for Turkish migrants at the national and City-State levels 
of Berlin politics. The existing literature on the three dimensions of political opportunity 
focuses on cross-national rather than multi-level comparison within the one nation. 
Nonetheless, this literature provides interesting insights into an analysis of differing 
political opportunity structures within Germany; a point that is explored in further detail in 
Parts 6 and 7 below. Looking first at the issue of formal political institutions, Germany’s 
cooperative federalist structure with strong state governments (Länder) set against a 
relatively weak federal government (Bund), could be characterised as a “weak” state that 
provides many access points for new actors.28 POS scholars also consider how informal 
procedures, including historical legacies can shape opportunities for  participation by 
determining which cultural views are accepted and which are not.29   Prevailing state 
strategies, a second aspect of this dimension, refers to how the facilitative or repressive 
nature of the state encourages or discourages political action.30 Particular aspects of state 
action, including a clientalistic “divide and rule” policy towards migrant groups, have been 
identified as weakening the participatory potential of migrants in Germany. Under this 
policy, non-state actors such as church groups and trade unions were funded to “supervise” 
migrants, leaving little room for autonomous action on the part of migrants themselves.31 
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Finally, the configuration of actors or “the specific balance of power relationships between 
actors at a given time and place” is also relevant.32 Such alliances include the relationships 
between state and non-state actors, as well as interactions among various non-state actors. 
Kriesi and his collaborators argue that in “high profile” policy domains where significant 
resources and political gains are at stake, corporatist policy monopolies dominated by 
several actors, can emerge.33 Immigration is seen as a “high profile” policy domain.34  
Consistent with this argument, several German scholars have suggested that non-state, non-
migrant organizations such as church groups and trade unions have created a “policy 
monopoly” in German immigration affairs which blocks the potential for autonomous 
participation by migrants themselves.35  
 
5: Methodological approach 
The POS literature provides fruitful beginnings for an analysis of the conditions for the 
political participation of Berlin’s Turkish migrants. In a comprehensive cross-national 
study, Koopmans and his collaborators point to the importance of national configurations of 
citizenship in shaping POSs differently for migrants in different national contexts.36 
However, this present study differs from previous works in this area in that it considers 
how possibilities for migrant activism are shaped by opportunities within countries at the 
different levels of government, as well as across countries. The issue of multi-level       
intra-national variance in POSs has not been considered extensively within the migrant 
specific POS literature. A number of scholars compare local POSs within one country or 
across several countries.37 In a more recent article, Koopmans compares the claim-making 
of migrants in various German states with claim-making in British and Dutch cities. 
Interestingly for the purposes of this study, he identifies low levels of participation in the 
then capital of Germany, Bonn, as well as in the Hague. This leads him to conclude that 
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“the national level is much less accessible to migrants than the local level.”38 Several 
scholars have also considered the interactions between different levels of government, 
across nations, and the impact which this has on political claim-making.39 
These existing studies point to a perception in the POS literature that the local level 
is more open to migrant activism than the federal level of politics. A key rationale of the 
present research was to test this suggestion empirically. In order to do so, the research 
applied POS theory to analyse and characterize the political opportunity structure 
frameworks at the different levels of German politics. It also analysed the potential impact 
of these frameworks upon levels of migrant activism. The key research hypothesis that 
different political opportunity structures at the different levels of government within 
Germany shape the levels of political engagement of Berlin’s Turkish migrants, was tested 
through ten lengthy interviews with eight Turkish organisations in Berlin in December 
2002 to February 2003. The interviewees came from a range of left and religious 
organisations. Press statements and publications of the organisations were also analysed. 
This qualitative analysis was complemented by a quantitative media analysis of coverage of 
the two case-studies in two major Berlin dailies; the leftist Berliner Zeitung and the more 
centrist Tagesspiegel. Over 180 articles were examined.  
 
As political participation covers an enormous variety of activities, the focus of the 
media analysis was on claim-making. Koopmans defines claim-making as “the expression 
of a political opinion by some form of physical or verbal action, regardless of the form this 
expression takes (statement, violence, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, 
etc…).”40 The research design for the media analysis was modelled on previous studies on 
the political participation of social actors by the Social Science Research Centre Berlin 
(WZB).41 The codebook for the media analysis was a simplified and adapted version of a 
codebook developed by Koopmans for a project on political mobilisation in the European 
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public sphere.42 A semantic approach to the construction of a claim was taken. By 
answering the “where” “who,” “how,” “whom” and “what” questions of each act, the 
location of the claim, the actors involved, the mode of claim-making (i.e. protest, speech), 
the addressee of the claim, the substantive issue of the claim and the symbolism of the 
claim, were recorded.43 All claims were recorded whether they were made by state actors 
(governments, the opposition or members of the administration or judiciary), citizen non-
state actors (i.e. non-state actors with German citizenship) or migrants (without German 
citizenship) at any level of politics.44 In order to capture the media’s role as claim-makers 
in its own right, opinion pieces and editorials were also recorded and included under the 
sub-division of “citizen non-state actors.” In the following section, the empirical findings 
are presented and discussed in light of POS theory.  
 
6: Dual citizenship and the Nationality Act (2000) debate 
The first case-study concerns the participation of Berlin’s Turkish migrants in the debates 
over the Nationality Act (2000). This debate extended from October 1998 when the Act was 
first discussed in the Bundestag (the lower chamber of the national German parliament) to 
late May 1999, when the legislation was passed. The claim-making of Berlin’s Turkish 
migrants claim-making is considered within the context of the three dimensions of the 
political opportunity structure. Prior to this theoretical analysis, it is necessary to consider 
the events that led to the new Nationality Act.  
 
a) Germany’s new Nationality Act    
In 1998, after fifteen years of conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) rule, a new 
Social Democratic (SPD) and Green coalition government was elected at the national level. 
The appointment of this government, dubbed the “Red-Green coalition” due to the political 
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affiliations of its two parties, represented a major juncture in German politics. One of the 
first plans for the new Coalition was to update Germany’s citizenship law.45 The Empire 
and Nationality Act (1913) adopted the citizenship principle of jus sanguinis or nationality 
by German descent. It contained nationalist overtones. During the historical debates over 
the Empire and Nationality Act, the legislation had been justified on the grounds that it 
prevented “non-German blood from being assimilated into the German fatherland.”46 
Despite this racialist pedigree, the 1913 Act remained in place until 1998. By this point, the 
naturalization of migrants was possible but a lengthy and expensive process. Further, dual 
citizenship was denied except in certain limited scenarios. As a result, Germany had a 1.6 
per cent naturalization rate, which was one of the lowest rates in Western Europe.47  
 
In light of this demographic reality, the Red-Green coalition proposed a new 
Nationality Act that made citizenship a birth right (jus soli) rather than a blood right. The 
introduction of dual citizenship was also proposed. This provision was warmly received by 
Turkish migrants, who had indicated that they would naturalize at much higher rates were 
they able to retain their Turkish passports.48 At the same time the CDU and their partners, 
the Christian Socialist Union (CSU) mobilized against the proposed reforms. The 
CDU/CSU ostensibly opposed dual citizenship on constitutional and international legal 
grounds as well as the perceived anti-integrationist potential of dual citizenship.49 As 
Hagedorn notes however, underlying most of these objections was a belief that dual 
nationality would ultimately change the demographic face of Germany.50 By allowing more 
Turks to migrate to Germany through family reunification programs, the dual nationality 
laws, it was believed, would make Germany more Turkish.  
 
Rallying support for their cause, the CDU-CSU coalition launched a signature 
campaign against the proposed Nationality Act in the lead up to an election in the State of 
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Hesse. Across Germany, five million signatures were collected.51 The election results 
marked a devastating defeat for the SPD and the Greens in a former Left stronghold. Many 
analysts argued that the swing to the conservatives was a negative response to the proposed 
Nationality Act.52 The most important effect of the Hesse state election was that the Red-
Green coalition lost the balance of power in the Bundesrat, the second chamber of the 
national German parliament.  In order to pass the Nationality Act through the Bundesrat, 
the SPD quickly reached a compromise with the centrist Free Democratic Party (FDP). The 
Act that emerged was a heavily watered-down version of the initial Red-Green plan. A 
birth right for all children born in Germany to non-German migrant parents was secured; 
provided the parents had been residing in Germany for eight years prior to the birth of their 
child.53 Dual citizenship was allowed until children reached 23 at which point they would 
have to decide between their foreign or German citizenship.54 The requirements of 
naturalization for those over 23 were tightened. While the final legislation did do away with 
blood citizenship, Turkish migrants in Berlin criticized the changes as insufficient. As 
Kenan Kolat, President of the Turkish Union of Berlin (TBB) stated: “Our final position 
was - better no law that this so-called ‘improvement’ of the national government.”55 
 
b) The political participation of Berlin’s Turkish migrants in the Nationality Act 
debate 
Given the importance of German citizenship as an issue for Berlin’s Turkish migrants, it is 
relevant to consider the degree of political participation of this group in the debate over the 
Nationality Act. The media analysis, the qualitative analysis of interviews with Turkish 
leaders in Berlin and the study of these organizations’ press statements, establish that 
Berlin’s Turkish migrants were only marginally involved in the debate.  The media analysis 
recorded the claim-making of all actors in the Nationality Act debate. As Table 1 below 
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indicates, of the 183 claims recorded, 8.2 per cent were made by migrants in total and 3.8 
per cent by Turkish migrants in particular.   
 
Table 1: Percentage of claim-making by migrants in the Nationality Act debate 
 
 
 
Actor category 
 
 
No. of claims 
Claim-making as 
percentage  
of all claims 
Turkish migrants    7      3.8 
Other migrants     8      4.4 
 
Total: Migrants  
 
   
  15 
     
      8.2 
 
Total: Other actors* 
 
168 
   
    91.8 
 
Total: All actors 
 
183 
 
100.0 
* Claims of all actors who are not migrants  
  Source: Own calculations, media analysis. 
 
The qualitative analysis of the interviews with ten Turkish leaders from eight 
organizations in Berlin supports the finding of the media analysis. Of the eight 
organizations interviewed, only two – the TBB and “Immigrün” – were actively involved in 
this debate.  The other organizations, while being interested in the proposed reforms, either 
organized events such as information sessions and public forums after the Act was passed  
or were not involved at all. Of the two groups actively involved, the TBB was the only 
organization to issue numerous press statements on the issue and to lobby political elites. 
The political claim-making of Immigrün, whose members are largely Turkish members of 
the Greens Party, focused on intra-party lobbying.  
 
c)  Political participation and the national political opportunity structure 
The three dimensions of political opportunity provide a useful explanation for the low 
levels of participation by Turkish migrants in Berlin in the debates over the Nationality Act.  
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i) The first opportunity structure: Formal institutions   
Formal institutions, the first dimension of the POS, can affect the “openness of access to 
the state, as well as [the state’s] capacity to act” [my emphasis].56 Here the focus is on how 
the institutions of parliamentary committees and cooperative federalism impact upon both 
the access of Turkish migrants to formal political channels and the national government’s 
capacity to act in its role as an ally to Turkish migrants. Institutional structures at the 
national level of the German political system can block access for new actors. Of particular 
importance are the parliamentary committees (Ausschüsse) that are comprised of members 
of the Bundestag. These committees are considered the major arena for law-making and 
lobbying in Germany’s national political system.57 While committee meetings are not 
completely closed to interest groups, the involvement of such groups is entirely at each 
committee’s discretion.58 The Committee on Domestic Affairs, responsible for the 
Nationality Act, held a Hearing of Experts on April 13, 1999. This Hearing took place after 
the SPD and FDP had negotiated the compromise model. Of the fourteen experts invited to 
the hearing, only one expert represented migrants. Further, Turkish migrants had no 
independent representation at the hearing.59  
  
 Germany’s cooperative federalist composition, while opening up opportunities for 
activists, can also inhibit the state’s ability to act in support of such actors. The potentially 
stultifying effects of the cooperative federalist structure on the national government are 
most evident in the powers and makeup of the German Bundesrat. This second 
parliamentary chamber comprises a proportionate number of executive representatives from 
the different states or Länder of Germany.60 The Bundesrat has the power to veto all laws 
that pertain to Land-level financial or administrative concerns (consent laws), which 
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encompass about 60 per cent of all laws.61  In times when the opposition in the Bundestag 
holds the balance in the Bundesrat, blockages will emerge; unless a compromise can be 
reached in the Mediation Committee between members of the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat.62 A compromise is accordingly informed by the political composition of state 
governments as represented in the Bundesrat.   In the present case-study, state actors were 
very important. State actors made 16.9 per cent of all claims and the Hesse state election 
was the third most important issue in the media analysis.  
 
ii) The second opportunity structure: Informal procedures and prevailing state 
strategies 
The structural significance of the Hesse election and the signature campaign was 
compounded by the symbolic or cultural significance of these events. Kriesi  argues that 
procedures and strategies over time determine “what kind of ideas become visible for the 
public, resonate with the public opinion and are held to be ‘legitimate’ by the audience.”63 
Germany’s traditionally ethnocultural understanding of nationality may have informed 
which voices in the debate were considered legitimately German, and which were not. As 
Brubaker suggests, historically to be German has been to be of German descent.64 The 
symbolic significance of the jus sanguinis laws was reinforced by political rhetoric that cast 
guest-workers as a temporary feature of the German landscape. The phrase “Germany is not 
a country of immigration” became almost an official refrain of the Kohl administration.65 
Through a denial of their very presence, the statement located Turkish migrants outside of 
the ambit of German identity. It thereby arguably undermined the political clout of claims 
made by this group.66  
 
The new Red–Green government’s platform was to challenge this ethnocentric 
understanding of German identity. However, the media analysis of the debates over the 
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Nationality Act suggests that at the early stage of the Coalition’s leadership, the 
ethnocentric definition of German identity which had been cemented under previous 
administrations, still had an enduring hold on the German polity. In the media analysis, the 
various issues raised in the newspaper articles were divided into those that supported the 
inclusion of migrants in German society and those that excluded them. Those issues 
pertaining to the exclusion of migrants were far more prominent in the debates over the 
Nationality Act than those which supported their inclusion.’ 
  
The signature campaign was the second most discussed issue. As a political claim, 
the signature campaign appealed to an ethnocultural notion of German citizenship and 
became a symbol of the German identity that needed to be protected against “new sources”, 
meaning “foreign”, Turkish sources.  
 
 iii) The third opportunity structure: actor alliances and configurations: 
Discourses can change over time. Proposing that political elites can play a central role in 
transforming national identity, Hagedorn points to the importance of the SPD-Green 
government in bringing citizenship onto the national agenda and calling for a jus soli 
model.67 Further, Left wing parties represent a major ally for Turkish migrants in Germany. 
An overwhelming 87.6 per cent identify with the Left.68 Given Turkish migrants’ weak 
electoral leverage, however, the strength of this alliance from the perspective of the 
political parties must also be investigated. Kriesi argues that when leftist parties are in 
opposition, they stand as powerful allies for new social movements. Leftist opposition 
parties can draw upon the claims of social movements to critique conservative parties in 
power. Once in power themselves however, leftist parties and especially the Social 
Democrats, will have to “place a heavy emphasis on the economic concerns of their core 
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electorate – that is, the working class.”69 This analysis has relevance to the case-study. The 
SPD and the Greens had been lobbying for dual citizenship for decades.70  After the 
electoral defeat in Hesse, the Red-Green Coalition realized that the political stakes of 
supporting dual citizenship could be too great. Renate Künast spoke for the Coalition in the 
aftermath of Hesse when she said that: “We have to be more concerned with everyday 
issues such as those involving youth unemployment.”71 By implication, dual citizenship 
was dispensable in a way that working class, economic issues, such as youth 
unemployment, were not.  
 
There were also difficulties in the Nationality Act debate in the actor alliance 
between Turkish migrants and the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners.72 The 
Commissioner is the most senior public servant responsible for migrant issues in Germany. 
She is also considered an important advocate of resident alien rights.73 The Commissioner 
at the time of the passage of the Nationality Act, Marieluise Beck, was initially supportive 
of the dual citizenship bill and critical of the compromise reached with the FDP.74 
However, as a Greens representative, she was compelled by party discipline to vote in  
favor of the Act and eventually backed the reforms.75  This move deeply disappointed the 
Turkish migrant community in Berlin and led to a souring of relations.  As put by Kenan 
Kolat from the TBB: “[The Government] is now saying: ‘It is a good law, we shouldn’t 
criticise it.’ … That is why we have had really big disagreements with Beck for instance.”76  
 
Relations between migrants and citizen non-state actors form the third area of focus 
of actor alliances and configurations. In contrast to corporatist theories of migrant 
participation, discussed in Part 3 above, the quantitative analysis of the current case-study 
provides little support for the argument that citizen non-state actors, such as church groups 
and unions, monopolize the political debate on migrant issues. As Table 2 below indicates, 
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when the media are excluded as an actor, there is only a 1.6 percentage point difference 
between the claims of those actors with citizenship and those without. This difference in 
percentage points is too small to offer quantitative support for the corporatist argument.  
 
Table 2: Claim-making of migrants compared with citizen non-state actors in the 
Nationality Act debate 
 
 
Category of actor 
 
Number of claims 
Percentage of claim-
making of all actors 
 
Turkish migrants 
Other migrants 
   7 
   8 
  3.8 
  4.4 
Total: Migrant actors  15   8.2 
 
Media 
Other 
 
 10 
 18 
 
  5.5 
  9.8 
Total: Citizen non-state 
actors 
 28 15.3 
 
Total: Non-state actors 
  
 43 
 
23.5 
 
Total: State actors* 
 
140 
 
76.5 
Total of all actors 183 100 
* Claims of all state actors.. 
  Source: Media analysis, own calculations.  
 
Qualitative analysis does suggest however, that some citizen non-state actors may 
have been consulted more than migrants. Yet, the “policy monopoly” was held not by 
churches or trade unions but rather, by legal experts. Hirner’s study of the committee 
system finds that experts often feature in parliamentary hearings.77 According to 
Katzenstein, the “high degree of professional expertise [in the committees] enjoins against 
partisan politicization of issues.” 78 The high presence of experts in the committees can 
therefore have the effect of encouraging middle-ground compromise.  With regard to 
debates over the Nationality Act, half of the experts invited to the hearing on the 
Nationality Act were constitutional law professors.79 As Green argues, the composition of 
the hearing “sp[eakes] volumes about the level at which the discourse … was located.”80  
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7: The Berlin headscarf debate 
The political participation of Berlin’s Turkish migrants in the Nationality Act debate can be 
compared with the participation of this group in the debate over the introduction of a ban 
on headscarves for teachers in public schools as well as in other areas of the public service 
in the City-State of Berlin. The period studied is from late September 2003 when the 
headscarf debate became a state issue to July 2004 when a bill was presented to the State 
House of Representatives. The purpose of this second case-study was to consider how the 
POS differed at the state, compared with national level of German politics.  
 
a) The headscarf ban in the public service  
The headscarf became a major issue in Germany in 2002 when Fereshta Ludin, a Muslim 
German of Afghani background, brought an action before the Constitutional Court; 
Germany’s highest court. Ms Ludin had been forced to step down from her position as a 
teacher in the State of Baden-Württemberg because she had refused to take off her 
headscarf while teaching. The Court of Baden-Württemberg had found that Ludin’s 
headscarf interfered with the religious freedom of her students. Ludin appealed this 
decision to the federal Constitutional Court, who proclaimed on September 24, 2003, that 
the prohibition on her headscarf was unconstitutional on the narrow technical ground that 
Baden-Württemberg had introduced its headscarf ban without primary legislation. On this 
basis, the Court called for each state parliament to pass laws on the status of the headscarf 
in the education sector.81  
 
At this point the headscarf became an issue in the City-State of Berlin. The City-
State was governed by a “Red-Red” SPD-PDS coalition and reactions to the Ludin case 
were split along party lines. Initially, the SPD was strongly in favour of a ban on 
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headscarves in the public service.  The post-Communist PDS82 was strongly opposed.83 The 
day after the Court’s decision, the Berlin Senator for Domestic Affairs from the SPD, 
Ehrhart Körting, announced the position of his party. The headscarf, he said, was an 
“expression of fundamentalism and aggression … against Western values and the 
emancipation of women.”84 Körting called for a speedy introduction of a headscarf ban 
across the entire public service.85 In stark contrast, Carola Freundl for the PDS demanded a 
balance between the religious neutrality of the state and the personal religious freedom of 
teachers.86  
 
Fierce debate ensued within the Red-Red coalition and across the City-State of 
Berlin. There was a great deal of public involvement. In January 2004, over 1000 Berlin 
Muslims marched through the city under the slogan “my headscarf is 100 per cent cotton 
and zero per cent terror.”87 Numerous foundations and think-tanks organized public 
forums.88 Most significantly, the PDS held a public hearing in the Berlin State Parliament 
in early March, in which a range of academics, politicians, teachers, representatives of the 
Muslim and Turkish communities and journalists participated.89  
 
The SPD gradually retreated from its initial position for a ban on headscarves across 
the entire public service. By the end of March 2004, the SPD and PDS were in agreement:  
Berlin would ban the headscarf but it would also ban other visible religious symbols (such 
as the cross, the Star of David and the Kippur) for public servants employed in schools 
(although not preschools), the courts, the judiciary, the court administration, the criminal 
justice system and the police force.  On July 20, 2004, the coalition presented the bill to the 
parliament and it was passed in early 2005. A package of measures to counter 
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stigmatization of Muslims in the State of Berlin, including a new anti-discrimination law 
(Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) accompanied the ban.90  
 
 Among the Turkish community of Berlin there were mixed reactions 
towards the ban. Most Turkish migrants in Berlin are Muslims but only one third are 
practising.91 Left-leaning Turkish migrants are influenced by Turkey’s tradition of laicism 
and most supported the ban.92 Some were even critical that the ban did not go far enough93 
while Islamic Turkish organisations opposed the ban.94 Of central importance to this study 
however, were not the differing perspectives within the Turkish community on this issue, 
so much as overall levels of participation of Turkish migrant groups in the political debates.   
 
b) The political participation of Berlin’s Turkish migrants in the headscarf ban 
debate 
The media analysis of the two newspapers over this period, the qualitative analysis of 
interviews with Turkish organization leaders in Berlin and study of press statements of 
those leaders’ organizations confirm that the Turkish migrants of Berlin were involved 
quite significantly in the debate. Looking first to the results of the media analysis, as Table 
3.1 indicates, 14.8 per cent of all claims were made by Turkish migrants.   
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Table 3: Percentage of claim-making by migrants  
in the headscarf ban debate 
 
Actor category No. of claims Claim-making as 
percentage of all 
claims 
Turkish migrants     31   14.8 
Other migrants    17     8.1 
Total: Migrants   48   22.9 
Total: Other actors* 162   77.1 
Total: All actors 210 100.0 
  * Claims of all actors who are not migrants.   
    Source: Own calculations, media analysis. 
 
The interviews with Turkish organizations confirm the comparatively high levels of 
political participation by this group in the debate. Only two of the eight organizations 
interviewed were in no way involved. Despite divergences in the level of participation of 
the six remaining, active organizations, all issued press statements on the topic and most 
were either invited to the Public Hearing in the Berlin Parliament or had lobbied 
parliamentarians on their stance on the ban. The overall impression from the interviews is 
that claim-making was substantially higher in the headscarf debate than the Nationality Act 
debate.  
 
c)  Political participation and the state political opportunity structure 
The high levels of claim-making among Turkish migrants in the debate over a headscarf 
ban was at 14.8 per cent almost twice as high as the claim-making of all migrants combined 
in the national debate. In order to understand why there were such high levels of 
participation, it is necessary to consider the three dimensions of political opportunity at the 
state level of Berlin politics.  
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i) The first opportunity structure: Formal institutions   
The openness of formal political institutions is informed both by access available to 
activists as well as the state’s capacity to act in concert with such activists. Looking first to 
the question of access, the state and local levels of politics are identified in the literature as 
the most participatory of German politics.95 This is also the case for migrants. The 
inclusion of migrants on parliamentary committee meetings and at public hearings is often 
stipulated in the institutional arrangements of state governments.96 Migrant representation 
in public hearings has been required on a semi-formal basis in the State of Berlin since 
1982.97 In the current case-study, the importance of formal access channels is apparent. The 
Public Hearing on March 4, 2004 was a vital opportunity for Turkish groups to voice their 
views concurrently with the debates over the ban. Smaller hearings were also organized in 
local councils throughout Berlin.98  
 
 The strength of state governments is also a relevant factor that informed the PDS-
SPD’s capacity to push through the ban on all religious symbols. As discussed above, at the 
national level, the composition of the Bundesrat weakened the institutional strength of the 
government, thereby requiring it to reach a less favorable compromise position. In the State 
of Berlin, members of parliament elect the mayor and eight senators to constitute the 
executive branch, the Senate of Berlin. Since the Parliament elects the Senate, state 
executives are particularly strong and opposition parties hold more symbolic than actual 
power.99 The results of the media analysis reflect the favorable institutional structures in 
place for German state governments. If institutional structures were to weaken a 
government’s capacity to act, we would expect the claim-making of opposition parties to be 
high because of their importance in political debate. At 9.5 per cent, the opposition claim-
making was substantially lower than the 16.9 per cent level of claim-making of opposition 
parties in the national debate.  
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ii) The second opportunity structure: Informal procedures and prevailing state 
strategies 
Informal procedures and prevailing state strategies may also have been important in 
informing the participation levels of Turkish migrants in the debate over a ban on religious 
symbols.  In contrast to the federal level of German politics where a ethnocentric culture 
undermined Turkish claims of attachment to Germany, a different political culture has 
emerged in the City-State of Berlin. As early as 1972, the State of Berlin acknowledged 
that Germany was “increasingly becoming a country of immigration.”100 This statement 
was revolutionary for its time and secured the State of Berlin’s position as a leading figure 
in migrant integration policy.101 Berlin was also the first state of Germany to appoint a 
Commissioner for Migration and Integration, Barbara John. Under the directorship of the 
Senator for Welfare and with the assistance of the Commissioner, the State of Berlin 
initiated a “self-help” programme. Migrant groups were given financial support to organize 
autonomously.102 This self-help encouraged political action on the part of migrants and  
equipped them with the necessary resources and “know-how” to participate in Berlin State 
politics.103  
 
 These symbolic and concrete aspects of the City-State’s prevailing strategies 
towards Turkish migrants may well have contributed to a political environment where 
claim-making by this group was seen as normal and was even encouraged. The media 
analysis supports this proposition.  A division of the 210 claims into issues reveals that the 
political discourse was not dominated by a singular definition of German identity, as was 
the case in the Nationality Act debate. Some actors did cast the headscarf as 
“fundamentalist” and incompatible with “German values.” However, these claims were 
balanced by claims on the constitutional right to wear a headscarf and the virtue of a ban on 
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all religious symbols. In short, there was a far greater spectrum of claims on German 
identity than at the national level. 
 
iii) The third opportunity structure: actor alliances and configurations 
The final dimension of the opportunity structure, actor alliances and configurations, is also 
relevant. Looking at the first actor alliance, that between Turkish migrants and the State, it 
is clear that Turkish migrants at the City-State level identify with the Left.  Had they rights 
of suffrage, over 64.4 per cent would vote for the SPD and over 88 per cent for leftist 
parties generally.104 The support that the PDS in particular provided for Turkish migrants 
was essential in ensuring an outcome that would not disadvantage Muslims over other 
religious groups.    
 
 The second actor alliance of concern is that between Turkish migrants and the 
Berlin Commissioner for Migration and Integration. In contrast to the Federal 
Commissioner for Foreigners, the Berlin Commissioner is non-partisan and sits within the 
state administration.105 While this renders the power of the Commission symbolic rather 
than political, the legacy of the previous Commissioner, Barbara John, suggests that the 
Commissioner can still play an important role in shaping immigration policy within Berlin. 
John represented a vital advocate of migrants’ rights both within Berlin and across 
Germany.106 In 2002, John was replaced by Günter Piening. While his opposition to a 
headscarf ban attracted the criticism of some laicist Turkish organizations, it also sent an 
important message to the Turkish community as a whole that the State of Berlin was not 
targeting Islam.107 His warnings against the potentially discriminatory effect of a headscarf 
ban alone in many ways preempted the enactment of the anti-discrimination law that 
prohibits discrimination on a number of bases, including on religious and ethnic grounds.108 
This was a beneficial corollary outcome of the ban.   
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iv) The State of Berlin: An outlier?  
It is necessary to briefly consider whether the City-State of Berlin is an outlier with regard 
to the open POS it provides for Turkish migrant activism. The states of Bavaria, Lower 
Saxony, Baden-Württemberg and Saarland have banned the headscarf from schools; 
leaving other religious symbols untouched. In Hesse, there is a headscarf ban in the public 
services as well as in schools.109 In analyzing the headscarf ban debate in Berlin and the 
claim-making of Turkish migrants in that debate, it has been suggested that the state POS 
differs in many ways from the national POS. Is it possible however, that the City-State of 
Berlin differs from both the national level and the other states of Germany. Without 
conducting separate media analyses of the claim-making of Turkish migrants in this debate 
in all these states of Germany– an enterprise well beyond the scope of this Chapter – it 
would be impossible to test this possibility quantitatively.   
 
In some ways the State of Berlin is the exception rather than the rule. With regards 
to actor alliances, the SPD-PDS alliance is unique to Berlin. Left-wing parties110 are only in 
power in three of the fifteen states of Germany, although it is in coalition with the CDU in 
an additional four states.  Given the close allegiance between Turkish migrants and leftist 
parties, it is likely that the actor alliances of Turkish migrants and state governments will 
not be as favorable in all German states as it is in Berlin. Yet, despite the State of Berlin’s 
idiosyncrasies, many of the factors that exist in the City-State of Berlin that foster a 
positive POS for migrants also exist in the other states. Access to public institutions as well 
as the unicameral parliamentary system are common features of all states.111  All states now 
have a Commissioner for Integration and many have followed the City-State of Berlin’s 
lead by initiating self-help programs for migrants.112 Similarly, Ireland finds similarities 
across the German states with regard to intercultural education and local-level integration 
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through social work with migrant groups – additional forms of facilitative state policy not 
considered in this Chapter.113 In short, while we could expect divergence in the openness of 
political opportunity structures across the various German Länder, a point made by 
Koopmans,114  there are shared aspects within the state system of German politics which 
appear more open to the political participation of Turkish migrant activists than at the 
national level.  
 
8: Conclusion  
This Chapter has considered the political participation of Berlin’s Turkish migrants at the 
two levels of German politics – the national and the City-State or Land levels. Two case-
studies have been considered – the participation of Berlin’s Turks in the debates over the 
Nationality Act (2000) and the participation of these migrants in the ban on religious 
symbols in the City-State of Berlin. This brief comparison of the claim-making of migrants  
in these events suggest that at least with regard to the two case-studies under examination, 
the political opportunity structure in place at the national level was significantly less open 
to migrant claims than that at the state level.  
 
Three dimensions of the political opportunity structure have been considered – institutional 
structures, prevailing state strategies and actor alliances. With regard to the two case-
studies, we find that these three dimensions interacted to provide a less favorable 
environment for Turkish migrant political participation at the national level, than at the 
state level of Berlin politics. The weak cooperative federalist system limited the capacity of 
the SPD-Green coalition to institute its desired dual citizenship reforms. The strong City-
State Berlin parliament, in contrast, assisted the SPD-PDS in introducing the ban on all 
religious symbols. A prevailing culture of migrant activism and “self-help” encouraged 
participation of Turkish migrants in the Land-level debate. Despite efforts by the Red-
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Green coalition, such a facilitative culture had not emerged at the federal level of German 
politics at the time of the Nationality Act debate. Finally, differences in the institutional 
position of political parties and the state and federal level government bodies representing 
foreigners, also affected the strength of Turkish migrant alliances with these political elites.  
 
 These three dimensions of opportunity correspond with differing levels of political 
participation at the different levels of German politics. In the federal case-study, Turkish 
migrants made 3.8 per cent of all claims, compared with 14.8 per cent in the City-State 
level. The interviews with Berlin Turkish elites confirm this finding that far fewer Turkish 
migrants were engaged in the debates over the Nationality Act than those over the ban on 
religious symbols. In the current case-studies therefore, the state-level provided a more 
facilitative environment for political participation than the national level.  One concern that 
could be raised about this conclusion is that the particular state-level case study inflates the 
degree of political participation due to the emotive nature of the headscarf debate. 
However, it could alternatively be argued that the attainment of German citizenship was an 
equally important issue, related to the key issue of legal inclusion of migrants within the 
German polity. As such, we could well expect far greater levels of political participation in 
this case-study than the analysis reveals. The empirical analysis indicates that this is not the 
case, in turn pointing to the importance of the political opportunity structures, rather than 
the particular substantive issues at stake, in shaping the levels of participation in the case-
study.  
 
This chapter does not seek to provide an exhaustive account of the opportunities and 
constraints upon Turkish migrant activism in Germany. A more comprehensive study 
would need to compare not only a larger range of federal and state-level cases-studies but 
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also more German Länder. This could well be a basis for future research in the area. 
However, in drawing attention to the qualitative and quantitative differences in the political 
participation of the Turkish community of Berlin in these two levels of German politics, it 
is hoped that this chapter has revealed important institutional and cultural dimensions that 
shape opportunities for migrant activism in differentiated ways. These aspects are not only 
a product of current political exigencies but also more deeply entrenched structural and 
cultural arrangements that emerge over time.  
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